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OUR CONSTITUTIONS-ALIVE AND
WELLt
SOL WACHTLER*
The heat in Philadelphia was once again bothering the 81-
year-old Benjamin Franklin. The convention1 was reaching its con-
clusion, and he did not feel quite up to making his one last speech
urging support for what was to become our Constitution. His words
were read to the delegates assembled.2 His characterization of the
product of that convention is worth repeating. He said:
[W]hen you assemble a number of men to have the advantage of
their joint wisdom, you inevitably assemble with those men, all
their prejudices, their passions, their errors of opinion, their local
interests, and their selfish views. From such an Assembly can a
perfect production be expected? It therefore astonishes me, Sir,
to find this system approaching so near to perfection as it does;
t The text of this Article is based upon an address given at the Chautauqua Institute
on July 3, 1987.
* Chief Judge, New York Court of Appeals; Chairman of the New York State Commit-
tee to Celebrate the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution.I The Constitutional Convention of 1787 met in Philadelphia from May 25, 1787 until
September 17, 1787. Fifty-five men, representing twelve states, attended. Of the original
thirteen states, only Rhode Island was unrepresented. See C. BOwEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADEL-
PHIA 3 (1966). For a more detailed discussion of the history of the Constitutional Conven-
tion, see 1-2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (1966).
2 1 F. THORPE, THE CONSTrITIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 589 (1901). Benja-
min Franklin played an instrumental role in convincing a majority of the delegates attend-
ing the convention to sign. Id. When the Constitution was read for the first time on Septem-
ber 17, 1787, many feared that it would be rejected by a majority. Id. "[A]t this critical
moment, Franklin spoke the word[s] which strengthened the friends of the Constitution,
and undoubtedly disarmed some of its opponents." Id. He said:
I confess that there are several parts of this constitution which I do not at present
approve, but I am not sure I shall never approve them: For having lived long, I
have experienced many instances of being obliged, by better information or fuller
consideration, to change opinions even on important subjects, which I once
thought right, but found to be otherwise....
I cannot help expressing a wish that every member of the Convention who
may still have objection to it, would with me, on this occasion doubt a little of his
own infallibility - and to make manifest our unanimity, put his name to this
instrument.
2 M. FARRmD, supra note 1, at 641-43.
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and I think it will astonish our enemies, who are waiting with
confidence to hear that our councils are confounded like those of
the Builders of Babel .... 
I often take pride in reflecting on the fact that it was here in New
York State that the Continental Congress called for a rewriting of
the Articles of Confederation to be held in Philadelphia.4 You see,
the Miracle of Philadelphia began in New York. But not long after
their arrival in Philadelphia it became clear that they were there to
do something more than the splinting and patching of a collapsing
set of Articles-they were there to build a nation. And those who
built it were not at all confounded like the "Builders of Babel."
We are now celebrating the 200th anniversary of that Consti-
tution7_-of the birth of our nation-and by any standard of which
I am aware, our celebration will be justified.
s 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at 642.
On February 21, 1787, the Continental Congress, while meeting in New York, passed a
resolution calling on each of the states to send delegates to a convention to meet in Phila-
delphia in May of 1787. See C. BOWEN, supra note 1, at 4; 1 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTrrUION
188-89 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner ed. 1987) [hereinafter THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION].
New York had served as the meeting place for the Continental Congress from 1785 until
after the end of the Confederation. M. JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES DURING THE CONFEDERATION 1781-1789 83 (1950).
' Most important among the problems of post-revolutionary America was the deficien-
cies of the Articles of Confederation. For the text of the Articles of Confederation, see 1 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 23-26. Under the Articles, "each State retained
its sovereignty." 1 D. WATSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY, AP-
PLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION 35 (1910). The Confederation "had no power to collect taxes,
defend the country, [or] pay the public debt." C. BOWEN, supra note 1, at 5. However, the
most serious weaknesses of the Articles were the Confederation's "impotency to control the
States, together with a want of general or centralized power, which would enable Congress
to compel compliance with national demands which were necessary to give the United
States standing and position among the nations of the world." 1 D. WATSON, supra, at 35.
8 When the Continental Congress sanctioned the Convention of 1787 it did so for the
"sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation." 1 THE FOUNDERS' CON-
STITUTION, supra note 4, at 189 (emphasis added). "Congress had said nothing about a new
constitution." C. BOWEN, supra note 1, at 4. However, "the delegates in Philadelphia con-
vened in May 1787 with no serious thought whatever of an attempt to keep [the Articles of
Confederation] in force." 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1512 (L. Levy, K.
Karst & D. Mahoney ed. 1986). Instead, the delegates "deviated from their instructions ...
and fashioned an entirely new instrument of national government . . . ." Gerlach, Toward
"a more perfect Union": Connecticut, the Continental Congress, and the Constitutional
Convention, 34 CONN. HIST. Soc'Y BULL. 65 (1969), reprinted in THE FORMATION AND RATIFI-
CATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: MAJOR HISTORICAL INTERPRETATIONS 216 (K. Hall ed. 1987).
' The Constitution has been the "supreme Law of the Land," U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2,
since June 21, 1788. See 2 F. THORPE, supra note 2, at 77. For a thorough account of the
debates accompanying the ratification process, see 2-4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1836).
OUR CONSTITUTIONS
The celebration of our Constitution will not be marked by fire-
works and tall ships. It will be a celebration of reflection.
Last July 4th we were reminded that we are the children of a
nation of immigrants. s Some of those immigrants were our own
parents, or grandparents. Many spoke an alien language, most were
poor and uneducated. Some came to these shores as slaves.' Per-
haps most significantly, they lacked both knowledge and experi-
ence with the democratic process.10 That they survived-and in
fact thrived-is a testament not only to their own fortitude, but to
the foresight of our constitutional forebears, and to the seeds of a
just government which they planted so firmly. We can be rightly
proud of our Constitution, for those who came before us did their
work well.
Yet we would be negligent to be satisfied with a mere celebra-
tion of the past. Celebrations are also a time for examination-to
consider where we are now, what the future holds in store for us,
and whether that future will see the survival of this great constitu-
tional experiment.
Examination begins with understanding, and we are fortunate
that the bicentennial celebration has engendered the kind of con-
structive debate which leads to understanding.
For example, we have the proponents of original intent,11 rep-
8 The United States, more so than any other country on earth, is a nation of
immigrants:
The whole history of the United States during the past three and a half centuries
has been molded by successive waves of immigrants who responded to the lure of
the New World and whose labors, together with those of their descendants, have
transformed an almost empty continent into the world's most powerful nation.
The population of the United States today, except for the Indians, consists en-
tirely of immigrants .... American society, economic life, politics, religion, and
thought all bear witness to the fact that the United States has been the principal
beneficiary of the greatest folk-migration in human history.
M. JONES, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 1 (1960).
9 The first slaves were brought to America in 1619. After that, slavery existed here for
more than 240 years. Jordon, Unthinking Decision: Enslavement of Africans in America to
1700, in SLAVERY IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 3 (1976); AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY 9 (A. Weinstein
& F. Gatell 2d ed. 1968).
10 Many immigrants came to America to escape the political oppression of their home-
lands; thus the American democratic process was something very new to them. See W.
SMITH, AMERICANS IN THE MAKING: THE NATURAL HISTORY OF THE ASSIMMATION OF IMMI-
GRANTS 9 (1939).
11 The doctrine of original intent is a principle of constitutional construction by which
courts in deciding cases which involve constitutional issues are to ascertain and "honor the
intent of the persons who framed and adopted the Constitution." Antieau, Constitutional
Construction: A Guide to the Principles and Their Application, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 358,
1987]
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resented by Attorney General Edwin Meese. He began this debate
a year ago in an address before the American Bar Association when
he said:
It has been and will continue to be the policy of this administra-
tion to press for a jurisprudence of original intention. In the
cases we file and those we join as amicus, we will endeavor to
resurrect the original meaning of constitutional provisions and
statutes as the only reliable guide for judgment. 2
358 (1976).
On a few occasions in the past, a number of Supreme Court justices have indicated an
inclination toward this method of constitutional construction. For example, in 1934, Justice
Sutherland wrote, "[t]he whole aim of construction, as applied to a provision of the Consti-
tution, is to discover the meaning, to ascertain and give effect to the intent of its framers
and the people who adopted it." Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 453
(1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting). Justice Goldberg, in 1964, said, "[o]ur sworn duty to
construe the Constitution requires.., that we read it to effectuate the intent and purposes
of the Framers." Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 288-89 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Some legal scholars have also maintained that the intent of the drafters of the Constitu-
tion should be controlling. Joseph Story, in 1833, wrote, "[t]he first and fundamental rule in
the interpretation of all instruments, is to construe them according to ... the intention of
the [drafters]." J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 135
(rev. ed. 1987) (1st ed. 1883). Thomas Cooley, in his influential work, Constitutional Limita-
tions, said, "[tihe object of construction, as applied to a written constitution, is to give effect
to the intent of the people in adopting it." T. COOLEY, 1 CONSTrrUTIONAL LIMrrATIONS 124
(8th ed. 1927) (emphasis in original).
However, relatively few legal scholars today subscribe to the original intent approach to
constitutional interpretation. See Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution:
Can Originalist Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1482, 1482 (1985). It has
generally been regarded as a "faulty concept." See, e.g., Address by Procter Hug, Jr., United
States Circuit Judge, Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, at the National Judicial Col-
lege, Robert Houghwout Jackson Memorial Lecture Series (Aug. 8, 1986), reprinted in Hug,
The Constitution, Judges, and Changing Times, N.Y. ST. B.J., July 1987, at 11 [hereinafter
Hug, The Constitution, Judges, and Changing Times].
The Supreme Court itself from the beginning has taken an active role in constitutional
interpretation, sometimes going beyond the perceived intent of the Framers. Illustrative of
this activism is the case of McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). In Mc-
Culloch, Chief Justice Marshall was faced with a legal challenge to congressional legislative
action establishing a national bank. Id. at 322. The challenge was based on the argument
that since the Constitution made no mention of a national bank, Congress was powerless to
create one. Id. at 366. The Court rejected this argument and upheld the establishment of a
national bank by finding that the Constitution not only gave Congress explicit powers, but
that it also gave Congress implied powers which the Supreme Court, in its wisdom, could
deduce. Id. at 324. See also infra note 19 and accompanying text (discussion of Marbury U.
Madison).
For a discussion of some of the arguments against the adoption of the doctrine of origi-
nal intent in constitutional construction, see infra note 12.
12 Address by Edwin Meese, III, Attorney General of the United States, at the Ameri-
can Bar Association in Washington, D.C. (July 9, 1985), reprinted in Meese, The Supreme
Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S. TE L. REv. 455, 465-
OUR CONSTITUTIONS
And in characterizing the rulings of the Supreme Court, the
Attorney General in a bicentennial lecture last October noted that
a constitutional decision by that court "binds the parties in a case
and also the executive branch for whatever enforcement is neces-
sary. But such a decision does not establish a supreme law of the
land that is binding on all persons and parts of government hence-
forth and forevermore."'1 3
66 (1986) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter Meese, Address at the American Bar
Association].
The Attorney General explained his concept of a jurisprudence of original intent last
year at a lecture at the University of Dallas by stating that-
At the deepest level, a jurisprudence of original intention does two things.
First, it seeks to discern the meaning of the text of the Constitution by under-
standing the intentions of those who framed, proposed, and ratified it. The inten-
tions of the Framers supply us with original principles. Second, a jurisprudence of
original intention is not confined to the circumstances from which those original
principles sprang. Rather, those principles can be applied to new circumstances,
circumstances unforeseen by the Founders themselves....
It is a jurisprudence that takes seriously the belief that the Constitution-our
written Constitution-means something, something that can be and must be dis-
cerned and applied to our modem circumstances.
Meese, Address at the American Bar Association, supra, at 466 n.60 (emphasis in original).
In general, the doctrine of original intent has been attacked on a number of grounds. It
has been questioned whether any court can ever "determine the intent of the framers as to
the precise meaning of words written ... 200 years ago." Antieau, supra note 11, at 358. It
has also been suggested that a single, collective intent has never existed. Brest, The Miscon-
ceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204, 214 (1980). It should also
be noted that fifty-five men participated in the Constitutional Convention and that many
more took part in the ratification process. It is highly unlikely that each of these men
ascribed to a single interpretation of the various provisions of the Constitution.
" Meese, Perspective of the Authoritativeness of Supreme Court Decision: The Law of
the Constitution, 61 TuL. L. REv. 979, 983 (1987).
The Attorney General bases his characterization of the Supreme Court on what he sees
as a major distinction between the Constitution and constitutional law. According to him:
The Constitution is... the instrument by which the consent of the governed-the
fundamental requirement of any legitimate government-is transformed into a
government complete with the power to act and a structure designed to make it
act wisely or responsibly ....
Constitutional law, on the other hand, is that body of law that has resulted
from the Supreme Court's adjudication involving disputes over constitutional pro-
visions or doctrines. To put it a bit more simply, constitutional law is what the
Supreme Court says about the Constitution in its decisions resolving cases and
controversies that come before it.
Id. at 981-82.
The Attorney General seems to underestimate the role of the Supreme Court in consti-
tutional construction. It must not be forgotten that the Constitution was not meant to be a
clear-cut and all-inclusive document. See Simon, supra note 11, at 1491-92 (language of
many provisions of Constitution is vague and ambiguous). In the words of Chief Justice
John Marshall: "[t]hose who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound
1987]
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Now criticism of Mr. Meese's position with respect to the Con-
stitution and the Supreme Court's role have come from varied
quarters. 14 Anthony Lewis of the New York Times, and a noted
author on constitutional principles, said that our Attorney General
is "making a calculated assault on the idea of law in this country:
on the role of judges as the balance wheel in the American
system."'15
And Benno Schmidt Jr., the president of Yale and a preemi-
nent constitutional scholar, said Mr. Meese was on a "disastrous"
course, speaking as "a man of power, not a man of law.""0
Although these characterizations appear harsh, I must confess
that I too have difficulty with a concept or principle which would
diminish the role of the courts in settling the law as it applies to all
of us.' I thought that had been settled as far back as Marbury v.
Madison,' which held that the judiciary was supreme in its expo-
sition of the law of the Constitution and that the Supreme Court's
decisions with respect to the federal Constitution were the su-
and interpret that rule." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). And these
interpretations are, until overturned by a later Supreme Court decision or constitutional
amendment, binding on all persons and parts of government. See id.
1 See Morgan, Professors vs. Meese: Scholars Malign the Attorney General, L.A.D.J.,
June 8, 1987, at 4, col. 3.
For a discussion of some of the arguments against the adoption of the doctrine of origi-
nal intent in constitutional construction, see supra note 12.
Lewis, Law or Power?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1986, at A23, col. 1.
10 Id. at col. 2.
17 If our system of government is going to survive, and indeed thrive, it is essential that
the role of the Supreme Court, as protector and interpreter of our Constitution, not be
diminished, and that an independent judiciary be maintained.
Since the Constitutional Convention, the United States has evolved from an
agricultural nation emerging from colonial domination into an industrial super-
power. The executive and the legislative branches experienced a correspondingly
dramatic increase in the breadth and scope of their activities. This enormous
growth carries with it a danger, however remote, that our government may come
to resemble its overbearing British ancestor against which the colonies had re-
belled. The need for an independent judiciary to safeguard the rights of the peo-
ple is correspondingly magnified, for governmental power carries with it always
the potential for abuse.
Kaufman, Maintaining Judicial Independence: A Mandate to Judges, 66 ABA J. 470, 470
(1980) (emphasis added).
When examining the role of the Supreme Court in our society one should keep in mind
the words of James Madison, the Father of our Constitution: "the Federal Judiciary is truly
the only defensive armor of the Federal Government, or rather for the Constitution and the
laws of the United States. Strip it of that armor and the door is wide open for nullification,
anarchy, and convulsion." Letter from James Madison to Joseph Cabell (Apr. 1, 1833), re-
printed in 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 740 (1947).
18 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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preme law of the land."9
As for the doctrine of original intent, I believe that we make a
serious mistake to accept the belief that the past has done its work
for the present, and that our liberty, which is the cornerstone of
democracy, is guaranteed. The truth is that one generation can
never protect the rights of another, and although all of our great
documents: the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution,
and the Bill of Rights, are ideal reflections of our finest aspirations,
they are not self-fulfilling chariots of justice. For all their beauty,
they are only words, dependent on each generation to give them a
meaning and content for its own time and place.20
For example, I cannot think of words less in need of annota-
tion than the truth so proudly declared self-evident in our inde-
pendence declaration that "all men are created equal."' Yet, it is
all too clear that while our founders wrote those words with hearts
full of devotion to freedom and justice for mankind, they never
once meant to include women or members of the black race. Every
generation, from Dred Scott,2 2 where a black person could be
owned, to Plessy v. Ferguson,23 where the Constitution was inter-
1 See id. at 177. The Marbury decision, which marked the first time that an Act of
Congress was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, established the principal of
judicial review. Judicial review has been defined as "the ultimate power of any court [partic-
ularly the Supreme Court] to declare unconstitutional and hence unenforceable: (1) any law;
(2) any official action based upon a law; and (3) any other action by a public official that it
deems to be in conflict with the Constitution." H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIARY: THE SUPREME
COURT IN THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 163 (6th ed. 1983).
20 "The strength of our Constitution is that it was wisely intended by [its Framers] to
be a living document adaptable to changing times." Hug, The Constitution, Judges, and
Changing Times, supra note 11, at 11. By this we mean that
[t]here is no such thing as a constitutional provision with a static meaning. If it
stays the same while ... society itself changes, the provision will atrophy.... A
constitutional provision can maintain its integrity only by moving in the same
direction and at the same rate as the rest of society.
Reich, The Living Constitution and the Court's Role, in HUGO BLACK AND THE SUPREME
COURT 133, 141-42 (S. Strickland ed. 1967) [hereinafter Reich]. See generally H. McBAIN,
THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 33 (1927) (living Constitution, like living skin, is "elastic, expan-
sile, and ... constantly being renewed").
21 The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
22 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). The issue before the Supreme
Court in the Dred Scott case was the status of a Negro slave who claimed that he was
forever emancipated upon being brought by his master from a slave state into territor r
made free by the Missouri Compromise. Id. at 347-48. Chief Justice Taney, speaking for the
Court, held that the protections of the Constitution did not extend to Negro slaves and that
a Negro slave was his master's permanent property whether in free or slave territory. Id. at
404-05.
23 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). At issue in Plessy v. Ferguson
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:381
preted by different Supreme Court Justices to say that there must
be equal treatment for blacks-but that equality could still be sep-
arate-to Brown v. Board of Education,24 where still different Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court, interpreting the same Constitution,
held that there must be true equality between the races. And most
recently, the Cleveland Firefighters2 5 case and the Santa Clara
Highway Department26 case, which upheld affirmative action to
achieve equality for blacks and for women. All of these progressive
interpretations of our Constitution have given the simple words
"all men are created equal" a meaning and content consistent with
and reflecting our evolving principles, our morality and our sense
of justice.
We have seen the same change and expansion of meaning oc-
was a Louisiana law which commanded that all intrastate railway carriers provide "equal
but separate" accomodations for whites and blacks. Id. at 540. Plessy argued that the stat-
ute violated the "equal protection of the laws" clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at
542. The Supreme Court, however, held that the statute was a reasonable exercise of the
state's police powers and thus did not violate the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 544, 550-51.
24 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown v. Board of Education, the question before the Su-
preme Court was whether the implementation of the doctrine of "separate but equal" in the
nation's public school system violated the "equal protection of the laws" clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Id. at 487-88. The Court held that this policy did violate the fourteenth
amendment, stating that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but
equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." Id. at 495.
25 Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986). Jus-
tice Brennan, writing for the Court, noted that "courts may, in appropriate cases, provide
relief ... that benefits individuals who were not the actual victims of a defendant's discrimi-
natory practices." Id. at 3072 (citing Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986)).
In this case, an organization of black and Hispanic firefighters sued the city of Cleveland,
alleging discrimination based on race and national origin in hiring, assigning, and promoting
firefighters. See id. at 3066-67. Local 93 intervened, and, over its objections, Cleveland en-
tered into a consent decree, agreeing to a specific affirmative action plan regarding promo-
tions of minorities. See id. at 3070. This consent decree was entered by the district court
and ultimately upheld by the Court. See id. at 3077.
26 Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987).
Johnson involved a male employee who claimed that the county transportation agency had
violated his civil rights by taking a female employee's gender into account in promoting her
over him in accordance with its affirmative action plan. Id. at 1446-49. The Supreme Court
held that the affirmative action plan represented "a moderate, flexible, case-by-case ap-
proach to effecting a gradual improvement in the representation of minorities and women in
the ... workforce," and thus there had been no violation of the male employee's civil rights.
Id. at 1457.
17 As our principles of justice and morality have evolved, so have the Supreme Court's
interpretations of our Constitution. In 1787, it may have been acceptable to some to con-
sider some races inferior people. Today, however, such a belief would be universally con-
demned, and thus all races are entitled to the same constitutional protections. This is an
example of what we mean when we say our Constitution is a "living Constitution."
OUR CONSTITUTIONS
cur with virtually all of our constitutional principles, 28 and as the
pace of our lives has quickened, so too has the pace of change.
I do not believe that any one of us is surprised that, despite
Attorney General Meese's statement that no ideological test would
be applied in choosing a replacement for Justice Powell,29 the per-
son originally chosen has said that "original intent is the only legit-
imate basis for constitutional decisionmaking." 30 Judge Bork has
qualified that observation by saying that "[w]e are able to apply
the first amendment's Free Press Clause to the electronic me-
dia .... [and] the fourth amendment's prohibition on unreasona-
ble searches and seizures to electronic surveillance. ... 31 But we
do not know, and he can not know, how the Framers' intent would
apply to the problems of pollution in the Hudson River or whether
a terminally ill patient should be removed from a life support sys-
tem-problems which are different in kind rather than in degree.2
There is a need for judicial respect for the prerogatives of the
executive and legislative branches under our separation doctrine.
There is a place for judicial restraint. But the protection of such
things as individual and privacy freedoms is a uniquely judicial ob-
ligation and responsibility. Judicial restraint should not be con-
fused with judicial abdication. 3
21 For example, individual privacy rights, rights which are taken for granted today,
have undergone dramatic changes since the inception of our Constitution. See generally A.
BRECKENRIDGE, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY (1970).
29 See Wash. Post, June 30, 1987, at Al, col. 1, A7, col. 2.
10 Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGo L.
REV. 823, 823 (1986). Judge Bork appears to have a restrictive view of the role of the Su-
preme Court in constitutional interpretation. "The operative terms of Bork's legal vocabu-
lary are 'strict' and 'narrow'. Rights must appear in the text of the Constitution before they
can be enforced by the court." Lacayo, The Battle Begins, TItE, July 13, 1987, at 10, 11.
For a discussion of some of the reasons why the Supreme Court should take an active
role in the area of constitutional interpretation, see supra note 17.
" Bork, supra note 30, at 826.
32 "It would be preposterous for us to assume and act today as if the Framers envi-
sioned solutions for problems that did not even exist when the Constitution was adopted
and ratified." Gangi, Judicial Expansionism: An Evaluation of the Ongoing Debate, 8 OHIO
N.U.L. REV. 1, 18 (1981). "The United States was barely populated, comparatively homoge-
neous, basically rural and largely agricultural at the time of the Constitution's adoption. We
live today in radically different circumstances." Id. Thus, it would be foolish for us to try to
determine the intent of the Framers with respect to many of the issues that arise in today's
society, simply because the Framers could not have had any intent with respect to these
issues.
'3 In our democratic system of government it is up to the judiciary to take an active
role in the protection of individual and privacy rights. It must not be forgotten that
[d]emocratic theory presumes constant shifting of minorities seeking to form
1987]
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And I do not think for a moment that our Founding Fathers
intended for us to interpret the Constitution according to their di-
vined intent, divorced somehow from contemporary understand-
ing. 4 As Thomas Jefferson phrased it, in a free society "nothing is
unchangeable but the inherent and unchangeable rights of man."
And John Marshall, a member of the Virginia Ratifying Conven-
tion and later Chief Justice of the United States, spoke to this very
point when he said that the Constitution was "intended to endure
for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various
crises of human affairs. '3 5
a majority coalition. The theory, however, is unable to provide protection to those
minorities that find themselves at an inherent disadvantage when forming politi-
cal alliances. Racial minorities and criminal defendants constitute such groups,
and they often find themselves permanently in a minority status before the legis-
lature. Such permanent minorities could easily be treated unjustly by an "ill-spir-
ited" majority. Hence, the usual democratic process provides insufficient protec-
tion because elected officials are too susceptible and responsive to organized
interest groups and popular prejudices. Legislators and executives, urged by in-
flamed or prejudicial constituents, may ignore the long term consequences of a
selective denial of rights and restrict the liberties of those particularly feared or
hated. Unlike the judiciary the political branches are constrained by their constit-
uents. These aforementioned democratic shortcomings, first "led the Constitu-
tion's framers to embed protection for fundamental personal liberties and scrupu-
lously fair criminal procedures in the Bill of Rights." Second, with equal foresight,
the Framers realized that the Supreme Court was the best suited to protect those
rights. The justices have life tenure, can be "bold against popular feelings and
opposition" as well as "demand the respect and obedience of an unwilling major-
ity." Chief Justice Warren put it well when he stated: "we have no constituency.
We serve no majority. We serve no minority. We serve only the public interest as
we see it, guided only by the Constitution and our own consciences."
Gangi, supra note 32, at 27-28 (footnotes omitted) (quoting the retirement address of Chief
Justice Warren before the Supreme Court of the United States (June 23, 1969), reprinted in
395 U.S. vii, xi (1969)).
34 During the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and the subsequent ratification
conventions,
[d]ebates over the language of the document were abundant, yet in none of them
did any delegate suggest that future interpreters could avoid misconstruing the
text by consulting evidence of the intentions articulated at the convention. Al-
though the Philadelphia framers certainly wished to embody in the text the most
"distinctive form of collecting the mind" of the convention, there is no indication
that they expected or intended future interpreters to refer to any extratextual
intentions revealed in the convention's secretly conducted debates. The framers
shared the traditional common law view.., that the import of the document they
were framing would be determined by reference to the intrinsic meaning of its
words or through the usual judicial process of case-by-case interpretation.
Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REv. 885, 903-04 (1985)
(footnotes omitted).
35 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) (emphasis in original).
Our Constitution is not a detailed code, but a structure, a fundamental charter for
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That Constitution, written in ninety days, has survived for two
hundred years; that Constitution, written with a quill pen, has sur-
vived to this era of the microchip, precisely because we have recog-
nized that the Framers of the Constitution were not so arrogant as
to suppose that they could anticipate the future."
And this nation has survived because there has been a recogni-
tion of our obligation to enact laws and to adapt the law to the
"crises of human affairs."
The original document was not perfect.3 Supreme Court Jus-
tice Thurgood Marshall, as a part of our celebration of examina-
tion and reflection, has said that the Constitution was "defec-
tive."3" He correctly noted that the document written in
Philadelphia two hundred years ago condoned slavery by evading
the issue. 9
This was part of the imperfection to which Benjamin Franklin
a society that in [1787] could hardly be envisioned. One of the chief concerns of
the Constitution was to strike a lasting balance between the individual and the
community, one that would ensure the existence of a nation that was both strong
and free. Such a balance might be composed of very different elements at different
times.
Reich, supra note 20, at 148-49.
" Perhaps the most significant reason our Constitution has endured to this day is that
its Framers "wisely spoke in general language and left to suceeding generations the task of
applying that language to the unceasingly changing environment in which they would live."
Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693, 694 (1976).
3,The Constitution was severely criticized at the time for its failure to prohibit the
importation and sale of slaves. These concerns were articulated by a noted group of essayists
and writers, the Anti-Federalists. "Establishing this constitution is, in our opinion establish-
ing the most ignominious kind of theft, man-stealing, and so heinous and agrivated [sic] was
this crime considered, by ONE who cannot err, that under the Jewish theocracy it was pun-
ished with death." Essays of Consider Arms, Malichi Maynard & Samuel Field, Reasons for
Dissent (Apr. 16, 1788), reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 255, 260 (H. Storing
ed. 1981). Other opponents emphasized the document's omission of a bill of rights. See Es-
says of Brutus (Nov. 1, 1787), reprinted in THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: FOR AND AGAINST
37-43 (J. Pole ed. 1987).
3s T. Marshall, Remarks at the Meeting of the San Francisco Patent & Trademark Law
Association (May 6, 1987), reprinted in LEGAL TIMES, May 11, 1987, at 15. Justice Marshall
noted that "the government [the Founding Fathers] devised was defective from the start,
requiring several amendments, a civil war, and momentous social transformation to attain
the system of constitutional government and its respect for individual freedoms and human
rights we hold as fundamental today." Id.
30 Justice Marshall pointed out that although the issue of slavery was the subject of
heated debate among the Framers, "use of the words 'slaves' and 'slavery' was carefully
avoided in the original document." Id. Although many of the delegates to the Constitutional
Convention opposed slavery, it was necessary to reach a compromise on this issue, since
South Carolina and Georgia would not ratify the Constitution unless the slave trade was
protected. See generally C. BOWEN, supra note 1, at 205-11.
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alluded.40 The abhorrence of slavery, today a closed question, at
least in our wiser corner of civilization, was very much an open one
at the time of the Constitutional Convention and, indeed, for al-
most three quarters of a century thereafter. Slavery at that time
was an established institution, although some of the delegates to
the convention, such as George Mason4  of Virginia and
Gouverneur Morris42 of Pennsylvania, urged abolition. They were
not to prevail, however, and the best that could be done at that
time without sacrificing the Constitution itself was to prohibit the
importation of slaves after 1808."3
The omission in the original Constitution of an express prohi-
bition of slavery does not indicate that the document, or the work
of the Framers, was "defective." The defect lay in prevailing social
values of the time, and when these progressed to a higher level, the
mechanisms of amendment,44 provided for by the Framers, and ju-
10 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
41 George Mason, who served as one of the four senior delegates from Virginia, was a
wealthy landowner, himself the owner of approximately three hundred slaves. See C. Ros-
srrER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 120-21 (1966). Ironically, Mason argued that the fed-
eral government be empowered to prohibit this "nefarious traffic." Journal of J. Madison
(Aug. 22, 1787), reprinted in 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at 370.
42 Gouverneur Morris, who represented the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania at the
Convention, was originally from Morrisania, New York. He participated in the drafting of
the New York Constitution, and unsuccessfully advocated the insertion in that document of
a clause proscribing the slave trade. B. MITCHELL & L. MITCHELL, A BIOGRAPHY OF THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 29-30 (1975). Gouverneur Morris "never would concur in
upholding domestic slavery." Journal of J. Madison (Aug. 8, 1787), reprinted in 2 M. FAR-
RAND, supra note 1, at 221. He stated during the Convention that slavery "was the curse of
heaven on the States where it prevailed" and a "nefarious institution." Id.
4' See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9. Article I, section 9 provides that "[tihe Migration or
Importation of Such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit,
shall not be prohibited by the Congress, prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and
eight . . . ." U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. This provision represented a compromise in a
debate among the delegates which threatened the fate of the Constitution itself. Oliver Ells-
worth of the Connecticut delegation speculated during the debates that "[i]f we do not agree
on this middle & moderate ground.., we should lose two States, with such others as may
be disposed to stand aloof, should fly into a variety of shapes and directions, and most
probably into several confederations and not without bloodshed." Journal of J. Madison
(Aug. 22, 1787), reprinted in 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at 375. The compromise was
reached on August 25, 1787 through the efforts of a committee consisting of one member
from each state. Although the provision adopted did not require Congress to pass legislation
prohibiting the slave trade, it freed the legislature to do so after 1808. See W. WIECEFK. THE
SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848 73 (1977). Legislation
forbidding the importation of slaves was enacted by Congress in 1807 and became effective
on January 1, 1808. See Slave Trade Prohibition Act of 1807, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 426 (codified at
46 U.S.C. §§ 1351-64 (1982)).
" See U.S. CONST. art. V. Article V provides:
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dicial review, as I have already outlined in the progression of cases
dealing with civil liberties, 5 were able to conform our governing
law to them. But the inherently human fallibility of the people, of
their institutions and their very instrumentalities of governance
still persist. So the pursuit of perfection and by that pursuit incre-
mental improvement continues as provided for in the Constitution.
The Constitution we celebrate is really two constitutions: an
arrangement for strong government which was the original docu-
ment written at that convention in Philadelphia, and the subse-
quent charter for personal liberties embodied in the Bill of
Rights.46 The further addition of the thirteenth,47 fourteenth48 and
fifteenth 9 amendments in the aftermath of the bloody Civil War
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legisla-
tures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as
Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the
several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other
Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amend-
ment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight
shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the
first Article; and that no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal
Suffrage in the Senate.
Id.
40 See supra notes 17-19 (development of judicial review); notes 22-27 (case law on civil
liberties protection).
4" The Bill of Rights is the name commonly given to the first ten amendments to the
Constitution, drafted by the first Congress. These amendments, containing a broad guaran-
tee of individual rights, were submitted to the states in September 1789, and were ratified
by December 15, 1791. Legislators originally proposed twelve amendments, ten of which
were accepted for submission to the states. See 1 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREA-
TISE ON CONSTITrrTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 3.1, at 202-03 (1986).
17 The thirteenth amendment, ratified on December 6, 1865. It provides: "Neither slav-
ery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their juris-
diction. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII, §§ 1, 2.
8 The fourteenth amendment was ratified on July 9, 1868. It provides in pertinent
part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
"9 The fifteenth amendment was ratified on February 3, 1870. It provides: "The right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The Congress
shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST. amend. XV,
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strengthened our commitment to liberty and equal protection
under the law. September 17, 1787 was the beginning. It started
there, but as our values became progressively enlightened, the
Constitution, by amendment and judicial interpretation, also be-
came progressively enlightened. Any attempt to freeze the Consti-
tution at some arbitrary starting point that supports the exercise
of executive authority while ignoring the obligation to protect civil
liberty is to ignore how far our nation has come over the last two
hundred years. To fault the Framers for having failed to anticipate
this in all its particulars is not only to expect of them the impossi-
ble, but to demean their considerable achievement in creating a
flexible document which was intended and has been made to re-
flect societal progress."
There is yet another component which should be discussed
during our bicentennial celebration. I believe the most important
contribution to come out of the Constitutional Conven-
tion-namely, the principle of federalism 51-has become the most
misunderstood feature of the American constitutional system
today.
In textbook terms, "federalism" has to do with the distribu-
tion and sharing of political power between national and state gov-
ernments.2 In human terms, federalism is like a marriage partner-
§§ 1, 2.
50 See supra note 27 (discussion of "living Constitution").
51 The American system of federalism, as designed by the Framers, was considered
unique among contemporary political systems. As Alexis de Tocqueville noted "[tihis Con-
stitution, which may at first sight be confused with the federal constitutions that have pre-
ceded it, rests in truth upon a wholly novel theory, which may be considered as a great
discovery in modern political science." 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 162 (P.
Bradley ed. 1945).
52 The new Constitution outlined this distribution and sharing of power. Professor
Wechsler identified three devices used by the Founding Fathers to implement our federal
system:
They preserved the states as separate sources of authority and organs of ad-
ministration-a point on which they hardly had a choice.
They gave the states a role of great importance in the composition and selec-
tion of the central government.
They undertook to formulate a distribution of authority between the nation
and the states, in terms which gave some scope at least to legal processes for its
enforcement.
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composi-
tion and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543, 543-44 (1954). Fur-
ther, spheres of power not specifically enumerated in the federal Constitution were reserved
for the states in the Bill of Rights. The tenth amendment provides that "[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
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ship. A federal relationship begins when two previously indepen-
dent parties agree to come together and form an indissoluble
union. In that union the parties become partners in the truest
sense of that term, retaining a certain amount of individual integ-
rity and autonomy, while at the same time giving up an equal mea-
sure of their independence for the good of the relationship. The
very word "federal" comes from the Latin fides, meaning "faith."
When he was writing The Federalist Papers,53 James Madison
referred to this system as a "compound republic," '54 which, he
noted, "is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitu-
tion, but a composition of both."55
Most of the Framers left the Philadelphia Convention with a
growing commitment to this "compound republic"-a system of
dual federalism which, while establishing a federal Constitution,
left intact that great body of state powers concerning the state's
ability to regulate public health, safety, education, community af-
fairs and family relations."
State constitutions, therefore, comprise a significant portion of
the American constitutional system. They authorize state power
and, with the United States Constitution, also limit it. 57 The
United States Constitution of 1787 thus did not create the Ameri-
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend X. James Madison
described the powers delegated to the federal government as "few and defined," THE FEDER-
ALIST No. 45, at 313 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961), and those delegated to the states as
"numerous and indefinite." Id.
03 The Federalist Papers are a collection of eighty-five essays which were published in
newspapers and directed at the citizens of New York. The writers, which included Hamil-
ton, Madison and Jay, wrote in support of ratification of the Constitution of 1787. First
published in 1788, the essays are a valuable aid in discerning the intentions of the Founding
Fathers; however, The Federalist Papers are, and should be recognized as, persuasive writ-
ings. See generally THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: FOR AND AGAINST, supra note 37, at 22-23
(The Federalist Papers viewed as political propoganda, not theory).
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
8 THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 257 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
James Madison described the respective spheres of federal and state power, noting:
[T]he former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace,
negociation, and foreign commerce ... The powers reserved to the several States
will extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the
lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the internal order, improvement,
and prosperity of the State.
THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 313 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
'1 See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 18 ("equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or
abridged on account of sex by the State"); MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 6 (limitations on imposi-
tion of ad valorem taxes); N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("no law shall be passed to restrain or
abridge the liberty of speech or of the press").
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can constitutional system; rather, it completed that system.",
Consider the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion,5 9 which provides that it and laws and treaties pursuant to it
"shall be the supreme Law of the Land," binding "the Judges in
every State."60 That is why state court judges must swear to up-
hold both the Constitution of the United States and the constitu-
tion of their state. If the Framers had intended the United States
Constitution to replace state constitutions, they would undoubt-
edly have made their Constitution the "only," rather than the "su-
preme," law of the land."1
Indeed, the United States Constitution was, in large part,
modeled after state constitutions. 2 I proudly digress to note that it
8 State constitutions
assume responsibility for dealing, and claim authority to deal, with the whole
gamut of problems cast up out of the flux of every day life in the state, save only
in the particular respects in which the Federal Constitution or statutes deprive
the states of any competence whatever or provide for an overriding or displacing
federal law.
Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 491 (1954).
Each of the fifty states has adopted a written constitution. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERN-
MENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1984-1985 221 (1984). Most state constitutions exceed the
federal Constitution in length and detail. See Developments in the Law-The Interpreta-
tion of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1355 (1982). State constitutions
can be amended easily, usually by popular referendum. Id. at 1354. Fourteen states hold
periodic constitutional conventions to consider major revisions. Id. The New York Constitu-
tion provides for regular constitutional conventions. Article XIX, section 2 provides:
At the general election to be held in the year nineteen hundred fifty-seven, and
every twentieth year thereafter, and also at such times as the legislature may by
law provide, the question 'Shall there be a convention to revise the constitution
and amend the same?' shall be submitted to and decided by the electors of the
state.
N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 2.
Twelve state constitutions antedated the Constitutional Convention of 1787. THE COUN-
CIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra, at 221.
" See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. It provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Author-
ity of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
60 See id. Hamilton wrote of the Supremacy Clause that "it will not follow from this
doctrine that acts of [the federal government] which are not pursuant to its constitutional
powers but which are invasions of the residuary authorities of the [states] will become the
supreme law of the land." THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 207 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
81 See Hart, supra note 58, at 516.
62 See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv.
L. REV. 489, 501-02 (1977). "[T]he drafters of the federal Bill of Rights drew upon corre-
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was our New York State Constitution of 1777 which first called for
the three separate branches of government63 and spawned the con-
stitutional guarantees of our libertiesas-guarantees later framed in
the United States Constitution's Bill of Rights-which were first
made public here in New York. And the United States Constitu-
tion was never intended to displace those state constitutions.
Alexander Hamilton, another author of The Federalist Papers,
contemplated that the state would remain the principal protector
of individual rights-"the immediate and visible guardian of life
and property." 5
Although some national law schools appear reluctant to teach
constitutional decisions of state courts of last resort, omitting them
from their Constitutional Law courses, casebooks and texts, the
fact remains that state courts, relying on state constitutions, have
admirably fulfilled Hamilton's prediction since before the estab-
lishment of the United States Supreme Court. Justice William
Brennan applauds this trend, calling its recent resurgence "an im-
portant and highly significant development for our constitutional
jurisprudence" today. 6 Between 1970 and 1984, state courts have
handed down over 350 published opinions holding that the mini-
mal requirements under the United States Constitution estab-
lished by the Supreme Court were insufficient to satisfy their own
constitutional requirements. 7
sponding provisions in the various state constitutions." Id. at 501. James Madison under-
took a comprehensive comparison of the provisions of state constitutions with those of the
federal Constitution in THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 323 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
13 The State Constitution, a great part of our nation's and state's history, was written
in 1777 principally by John Jay, the first Chief Judge of the State of New York before he
served as the first Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, and by Robert Living-
ston, the first Judicial Chancellor of the State of New York and a fellow graduate with Jay
of Kings (now Columbia) College and his first law partner. That state document, as just one
example, contained the seminal due process provisions later found in our nation's Bill of
Rights. See infra note 64. It was also the first constitution to provide for the three separate
branches of government, the fundamental structure of government later embodied in our
federal Constitution. See N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. II.
" The preamble to the New York Constitution of 1777 states its aim is to "establish
such a government as they deem best calculated to secure the rights and liberties of the
good people of this State." N.Y. CONST. of 1777, preamble.
11 THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 107 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
'6 Brennan, supra note 62, at 495.
'7 See, e.g., People v. Drisbow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 115, 545 P.2d 272, 280, 127 Cal. Rptr.
360, 368 (1976) ("We pause ... to reaffirm the independent nature of the California Consti-
tution"); Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. Supp. 394, 515 A.2d 134 (Super. Ct. 1986) (regulation of
funding for abortions violates rights of woman and physician under state constitution);
State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 265, 492 P.2d 657, 664 (1971) (state court is "final arbiter" of
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These decisions, and similar ones of state courts of last resort
throughout the nation, indicate, in Justice Brennan's words, that
"the Brandeis state laboratories are once again open for busi-
ness." 8 What this means is that dual federalism, contemplated by
the Framers yet ignored in recent years, is no longer a moribund
theory, but once again a vital governmental concept and tool, an
elegantly balanced machine of government by both state and na-
tional governments under state and national constitutions.
And so the celebration of our Constitution continues. We will
hear some describe the Framers as exemplars of a revolutionary
idealism the likes of which we will never see again-and others will
see them more as politicians than statesmen, who struck pragmatic
deals out of self-interest. There will be those who will speak of
"defects '6 9 and others will insist on "original intent, 1' but in the
final analysis there will be the inevitable realization that we were
given a Constitution which is nothing short of miraculous-as Ben-
jamin Franklin said: "so near to perfection. 7 1
But, as I noted initially, this celebration must also be a time
for resolve, and that must include a recognition that the primary
predicate for the Constitution was the expressed need to create a
society free from governmental oppression-to guarantee the indi-
vidual's liberty under the law.
So long as we remain constant to that objective; so long as we
recognize that we bear the burden not to appease the majority, but
to protect the rights of the individual; so long as we are willing to
defend in our courts those basic freedoms which are cherished by
all of our citizens-even if that protection is unpopular-then we
will have done our part in our time in seeing to it that the future of
our Constitution is secure.
Time moves quickly, and while the present may seem eternal,
all too soon future generations will be here to appraise us as we
now appraise the work of our forebears. When they do, we hope
they will conclude: This was our nation-still in its youth-and we
too did our work well.
state constitution which can provide greater protection than federal Constitution); People v.
Class, 67 N.Y.2d 431, 494 N.E.2d 444, 503 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1986) (warrantless search violative
of state constitution but not of federal); Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244, 249, 341
A.2d 62, 64 (1975) (court must indicate that decision is premised on state constitution).
68 W. Brennan, Jr., Remarks at the Lawyers for the Library Dinner (Apr. 16, 1987).
69 See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
70 See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
71 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at 642.
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